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 Subjects estimate the probabilities for a series of upcoming events. 
 
  Next, subjects value state claims based on the each event. 
 
 After the events have taken place, subjects recall their probability estimates. 
 
 Subjects’ hindsight bias is calculated using initial and recalled probabilities. 
 
 When subjects’ earnings are higher, they exhibit more hindsight bias. 
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EARNINGS AND HINDSIGHT BIAS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
1. Introduction 
Hindsight bias may be an important determinant of behavior in financial markets.  
Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) discovered hindsight bias, a propensity for subjects to 
remember or reconstruct probabilities in such a way as to make them seem to have 
“known it all along.”  Hindsight bias has been linked to overconfidence (Roese and Vohs 
(2012)), and overconfidence may be an especially important investment bias ((Shiller 
(2000), Hirshleifer (2001)).  Our experiment extends the hindsight bias literature to a 
market-oriented environment, and our results show that subjects exhibit a greater degree 
of hindsight bias when they earn more, suggesting that superior investment performance 
leads to increased hindsight bias. This may in turn produce overconfidence.   
We design a prediction experiment where subjects are asked to estimate 
probabilities and then to value a series of state-contingent claims that pay according to 
the outcomes of a series of future events. First, subjects are asked to estimate the 
probabilities for the events, each of which will be resolved over the next two weeks.  
Subjects then value state-contingent claims.  After the events are resolved, subjects are 
invited back to collect their earnings, and are again asked to recall their earlier estimates.  
Differences between the initial and post-event probability estimates are used to calculate 
the existence and magnitude of the hindsight bias. We find that many participants exhibit 
hindsight bias, and we present evidence that the magnitude of the hindsight bias is greater 
when subjects earn very high profits.  
*Manuscript
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
experimental design. Results are reported in Section 3.  Discussion and concluding 
remarks follow in Section 4. 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiments begin with a questionnaire directing subjects to estimate the 
probability of specified outcomes for a series of public events due to happen over the 
coming two-week period.  These events are related to financial markets, sporting events, 
weather, and other events with high media exposure. 
TABLE 1 
An example of events used in the study. 
By necessity, the events differ across sessions. 
Event Category 
That the maximum temperature in Rome, Italy will exceed the maximum 
temperature in Madrid, Spain on Saturday May 25
th
. 
Weather 
That the film The Great Gatsby will be in the top 3 of the US box office chart for 
the weekend of 25
th
 to 26
th
 May. 
Entertainment 
That the New York Yankees baseball team will beat the New York Mets baseball 
team, at Yankee stadium on May 29
th
. 
Sports 
 
The next phase of our experiment consisted of twenty periods. At the start of each 
period an event was announced, selected from one of the events on the initial 
questionnaire.  Subjects then value an asset based on that event using the Becker, Degroot 
and Marschak (1964) valuation-elicitation technique (BDM). The assets are state-
contingent claims paying 100 trading dollars if the announced outcome occurs, or nothing 
otherwise.  The BDM technique was implemented using a custom program written in z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  After subjects value the asset, the program selects a uniform 
random number from the interval [0,100].  If the random number is greater than the 
subject’s value, then the subject is given trading dollars equal to the random number.  But 
if the random number is less than or equal to the subject’s value, then the subject is given 
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one share of the state-contingent claim.  Therefore, each period, the subject will have 
either one asset certificate, or a cash balance corresponding to the random uniform 
number.  
Approximately two weeks later, subjects received an email reminding them to 
collect their payment.  Prior to payment, the follow-up questionnaire was administered. 
With the outcomes as well as their earnings for each of the events in hand, subjects were 
invited to recall the probabilities that they assigned earlier to the events, or to reconstruct 
their earlier estimates.  
 
3.  Results 
The participants in the market experiments were students at Aston Business 
School, with most from either the MSc Finance and Investments program or the MBA 
program. The initial sessions took approximately ninety minutes including time for 
reading the instructions, questions, and some practice rounds. Forty-six subjects in total 
have participated, with average earnings at 22.55 GBP, and maximum earnings at 34.67 
GBP.
1
   
We now document the existence of hindsight bias in our sessions.  Our measure 
of hindsight bias uses the Brier probability score (Brier (1950)), a measure of forecast 
accuracy, as a building block.
 
  The Brier score requires probability estimates for a series 
of N events.  The Brier score (PS) is calculated using: 
                                                 
1
 One subject was excluded from the analysis because s/he put either 0% or 100% as the 
initial probabilities for almost all of the events.  The subject may not have understood the 
concept of probabilities, but even if s/he did, it would be much easier for that subject to 
reconstruct the initial probabilities. 
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,  (1) 
where p is the subject’s probability estimate for event i, and E is an indicator variable set 
to one if the event occurs, or set to zero otherwise.  Lower values for the probability score 
signify greater forecast accuracy.  A subject choosing the “correct” probability estimates 
will minimize the expected value of the score. The Brier Score is the same as the 
quadratic scoring rule, which is sometimes used in experimental economics to incentivize 
subjects to elicit probability estimates.  Here, we use the Brier solely for measuring 
forecast accuracy.  
Our design requires subjects to make two probability estimates per event.  One 
estimate (IQ) is made via the initial questionnaire, and the other (2W) is made during the 
follow-up questionnaire.  In addition, an implied estimate (BDM) is made indirectly.  
Since a subject’s valuation of each state-contingent claim depends on his or her beliefs 
about the likelihood of the associated event, we can interpret the elicited value as a risk-
neutral probability estimate.  
TABLE 2 
Comparing IQ, BDM and 2W Brier Scores 
Paired t and Wilcoxon signed rank hypothesis tests comparing subjects’ IQ, BDM and 2W Brier scores. 
The asterisk denotes a probability value less than 0.05 (two-tailed).  
n = 45 Ho t Prob Wilcoxon SR Prob 
 HS = 2W Brier - IQ Brier = 0 4.13 <.001* 332.5 <.001* 
 BDM Brier = IQ Brier 2.81 .007* 223.5 .013* 
 BDM Brier = 2W Brier  0.08 0.934 25.50 0.77 
 
Differences between the IQ and 2W estimates provide a measure of hindsight bias 
(HS).  The intuition is straightforward.  Hindsight bias means that a subject will 
reconstruct probabilities to make them seem to be more accurate forecasters.  Our results 
  
PS =
1
N
pi -Ei( )
i
å
2
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show that the 2W Brier score is lower than the IQ Brier score, indicating that our 
subjects, at least in aggregate, are prone to hindsight bias. 
We also reject the null that the IQ Brier equals the BDM Brier. There are two 
possible interpretations.  First, recall that the IQ probabilities are not incentivized, but the 
BDM procedure is. Subjects may be answering more carefully.  A second possibility is 
that the way we are framing the question in the BDM somehow leads to more accurate 
estimates.  In the initial questionnaire, subjects are simply asked to state the probability 
that an event will occur.  In the BDM procedure, subjects are asked to determine the 
value of a state-contingent claim based on the event. 
The final comparison concerns the BDM and 2W Brier scores.  It is tempting to 
interpret differences between the two scores as an implied hindsight bias.  However, this 
interpretation is problematic.  The BDM valuation requires subjects to provide a 
maximum willingness to pay, not a direct probability estimate.  In most hindsight bias 
research, the focus is on probabilities, but it is certainly possible to imagine an analogous 
effect using values.  For example, suppose a subject is asked to estimate next quarter’s 
EPS for a company.  After the EPS is released the subject is asked to recall their prior 
estimate.  It may be an interesting topic for future research study whether hindsight bias 
would differ in magnitude when compared with the typical formulation in probabilities.   
A second issue is that in our follow-up questionnaire, subjects are specifically 
asked to recall their initial estimates, not the values submitted as a part of the BDM 
procedure.  Differences between the BDM and 2W Brier scores do not necessarily 
indicate hindsight bias. 
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To study high earnings and hindsight bias, we divide each subject’s responses into 
two subgroups.  For each event, earnings can only be between zero and one hundred.
2
  
For each subject, we calculate our hindsight measure twice, once using those events 
where earnings were greater than a cutoff, and again using only events where the 
subject’s earnings were less than a cutoff.  We perform this exercise for cutoff values of 
50, 60, 70, and 80.  
TABLE 3 
Hindsight Bias and Earnings 
Paired t and Wilcoxon signed rank hypothesis tests comparing subjects’ hindsight measures, with high and 
low earnings.  The hindsight measure is calculated using the only the events where earnings are greater 
than the cutoff value, and again using events where earnings are less than the cutoff value. Difference is 
HSSubject i | events where i’s earning ≥ Cutoff – HSSubject i | events where i’s earning < Cutoff.  The null hypothesis is: Difference = 0.  
All tests are two-tailed. 
n=45 Cutoff Difference t Prob Wilcoxon SR Prob 
 80 .038 2.30 .03* 222.0 0.01* 
 70 .025 1.44 0.15 204.0 0.02* 
 60 .012 0.63 0.54 28.0 0.76 
 50 .015 0.84 0.40 65.5 0.47 
 
We conduct paired tests with the null hypothesis that a subject’s hindsight bias is the 
same with high and low earnings.  The null is rejected with the higher cutoff values (70 
and 80), providing support for our hypothesis that successful performance is associated 
with increased hindsight bias.  Our subjects are prone to a greater amount of hindsight 
bias for events where they are very successful, where they earn close to the maximum 
possible amount. 
 
                                                 
2
 Aggregating across subjects, earnings were 0 for 29% of the questions answered, and 
100 for 11% of the questions answered.  Earnings were above 50 for 53%, above 60 for 
46%, above 70 for 38% and above 80 for 30% of the questions. 
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4. Summary 
Psychologists have discovered that individuals are often subject to hindsight bias, 
a tendency to remember or reconstruct probabilities in such a way as to make them seem 
to have “known it all along.”  We measure the hindsight bias as the “improvement” in 
forecast accuracy between the initial probability estimates and the reconstructed estimates 
after the event outcomes are known.  Our first results pertain to forecast accuracy.  We 
detect hindsight bias in many subjects.  Further, we find that valuation of the state 
contingent claim helps subjects to improve forecast accuracy over estimates based on 
initial questionnaires.  
Our next results concern hindsight bias and performance. Subjects’ hindsight bias 
is greater for events where they earned greater earnings.  Perhaps high earnings confirm 
the notion that a subject has known it all along. Our experiments are a first step in 
understanding the dynamic properties of behavioral biases, and support the existence of a 
link between hindsight bias and performance.  Better performance is associated with a 
greater degree of hindsight bias.   
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